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A Coma Speaks 
Dead Zones of Media and 
the Replication of Family Value 
Richard Doyle1 
Poroi
 
, 1, 1, January, 2001 
    
 
 
 
They’ll get a fuckin shock, when they see 
this near-corpse, this package of wasting 
flesh and bone just rise and say . . .2 
 
 
1 
 
The massive changes wrought by the narratives and practices of 
molecular biology have shifted the very concept of “life” at play in 
contemporary culture, as distinctions between “living systems” and 
“machines” have begun to blur and morph.3  No longer attached to 
“organisms,” life becomes an emergent attribute of information 
systems, networks without any obvious center.  As in the example 
of artificial life – organisms that live “in” computers – 
contemporary culture is beginning to be populated with entities 
whose “life” is both uncertain and difficult to locate.  Uploaders – 
subjects who actively pursue their own implosion into an 
informational substrate – form a futures market for a subjectivity 
franchise on the Internet domain, an ex-corporation whose 
installation shatters the autonomous individual into a sample of 
continual variation.  More than a repetitious immortality, 
uploaders provoke a new relation to the future:  being-sampled. 
 The very transformations that would make possible the “copying” 
of human subjectivity onto silicon also enable new forms of 
deterritorialization, the promiscuous splicing of subject effects not 
unlike those acts of bacterial transduction detailed by biologist 
Lynn Margulis.4 
 
 
2 
 
These new distributions of vitality – both fantastic and scientific – 
are not confined to that usual ecology of virtuality, silicon.  
Comatose bodies cultivate yet another, singular execution of an 
informatic body.  Accompanied by more than the visualization of 
an EEG and the machinic yoga of life support – breathe in! breathe 
out! – coma victims are connected to multiple rhetorical machines 
that would govern this strange flesh and enable its narration.  In 
what follows, I map out some of the capacities and threats posed 
by those bodies whose vitality is articulated as a signal, “wetwares” 
through and by which contemporary informatics operates.5 
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Out of the Barrel of a Gun 
 
3 
 
Gary Dockery, a Chattanooga police officer, was shot in the head in 
September of 1988.  He subsequently went into a comatose state, 
and was silent for 7 years.  In February of 1996, Dockery developed 
pneumonia, and his condition worsened as his lungs filled with 
fluid.  “His family was given the choice of risky surgery or letting 
the disease take his life.” Such a decision, of course, proved 
difficult:  How to manage the enormous contingencies associated 
with such a calculation?  On the one hand, the family had good 
reason to wonder if the pneumonia was not a blessing, an end to 
the lengthy suffering he had endured.  At the same time, the very 
indeterminacy of Dockery’s state argued for further aid; some 
argued that he had suffered enough, others thought that no help 
should be spared. 
 
 
4 
 
Only the agon and difference of argument could broker such a 
decision; a true differend, the Dockery’s decision could not be 
made through recourse to any maxim or law, even as it was the law 
itself that distributed the decision to the family.  Family members 
argued the situation in Dockery’s room as Dockery grappled with 
pneumonia in silence. 
 
 
5 
 
Four hours later, Dockery spoke.  For eighteen straight hours, 
Dockery spoke of the time, read thermometers both digital and 
analog, and said that he “did not want to go back to the village,” a 
nursing home facility where he had been “living.”  The sheer excess 
of the discourse, as well as its novelty, provoked media interest, 
and within hours the story was reported in print, television, radio 
and web sources.  The volume of talk about Gary Dockery’s coma, 
both by Dockery and the media, would be difficult to quantify, but 
it unerringly focused on the odd rhetorical situation the Dockerys 
found themselves in.6  Of what “caused” Gary’s return, Dr. 
Folkening said Gary Dockery’s illness, the change of environment, 
an onslaught of visitors after years of sparse contact and hearing 
discussions of his death may have contributed to his awakening.7 
 
 
6 
 
In light of Dockery’s discursive eruption, the family decided to go 
ahead with the surgery.  But even as Dockery’s speeches would 
seem to eradicate the ambiguity of the coma – clearly he was alive, 
unambiguously responding to his name, talking with his child on 
the telephone – a new and disturbing uncertainty emerged out of 
Dockery’s clarification.  If Dockery had made it clear to his family 
that he indeed wanted to live, his very persuasiveness threatened 
the fragile certainty that surrounded comatose patients 
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everywhere.  If such agency persisted in the coma victim, a patient 
for whom families must speak, it would render even more difficult 
and uncertain the calculations that under gird life support.  Even 
after his testimony, the Dockerys were unsure of the decision to 
operate, as the surgery could once again plunge Gary into silence 
even as he spoke for his life for 18 hours.  On the Christian 
Broadcast Network, Gary’s mother spoke of their discord:  “I had 
to wrestle with some of them.  Some of them did want to give up.  
As a matter of fact, last Sunday most all the family, his son and 
even some of my children wanted to give up and just go ahead and 
let him go, and I refused because God gave me a promise.”8  
 
7 
 
But the ambiguity provoked by Gary Dockery’s blue streak was not 
confined to the decision regarding his own surgery; it would haunt 
the deployment of decisions made by families everywhere.  These 
decisions were already troubled by the impossible evaluation of the 
contingency or “worth” of the patient’s life; now the dangerous 
outbreak of comatose agency in Chattanooga undermined the 
“worth” of familial opinion itself; Dockery’s voice would seem to 
have more weight than the legally legitimated voice of the family, 
that voice through which the coma speaks.  So, too, was the 
popular image of medicine under attack. 
 
 
8 
 
The wonder of the Gary Dockery saga is why did he speak just as 
his family was resigned to letting him die?  “We have no 
explanation at this time,” Dr. Kaplan says.9  
 
9 
 
The silence of the medical community only exacerbated the import 
of a prior silence – that of comatose bodies:  “I think the biggest 
interest this will spark is mutism after this sort of injury.  We 
assume mute means that not much is going on.  The fact remains 
that Gary Dockery was mute for seven and one half years and now 
is capable of speech.”10  The medical profession worked quickly to 
dispel any fears that the brain dead were anything other than 
unambiguously dead.  While early reports of the Dockery case 
spoke of his emergence from a coma, not “the mummy walks” but 
the coma speaks, physicians gradually pointed out a subtle 
distinction between two different types of “brain death” – the 
persistent vegetative state ( PVS) and whole brain death or 
brainstem death.  On National Public Radio listeners learned that 
Dr. John Caronna, a professor of clinical neurology, tells Noah that 
the story of Gary Dockery's waking up from a 7-year coma is not 
entirely accurate.  Medically Dockery has maintained 
consciousness, but severe brain damage from a gunshot wound 
limited his response to stimuli.  Caronna says something energized 
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him, increasing his ability to communicate.  But it’s unclear if he 
will continue to improve or not.11 
 
10 
 
This “grandfathering” of Dockery into a PVS rather than a whole 
brain or brainstem death failed to eradicate the ambiguity that 
suffuses the coma patient.  How could there be more than one type 
of “brain death?”  The proliferation of distinctions makes possible 
finer grades of discipline on the comatose body – indeed it makes 
the difference between being a “neomort,” available for organ 
donation, and being a comatose subject, available, contingently, 
for the future – but it also undermines the univocality and 
persuasiveness of the declarations of death.  No longer a binary 
“She’s alive!” or “I’m sorry, we lost her,” the diagnosis of death 
now becomes a continuum, with each distinction threatening to 
blur into the next, while the comatose body prepares to be 
“energized.”  The “something” that enabled a comatose body to 
speak in this instance was, of course, a very specific species of 
speech act or virtual witnessing that operates through the absence 
not of the other but of the self:  “hearing discussions of his 
death.”12 
 
 
11 
 
Of course, “comas” have always been speech acts.  First articulated 
as a medical definition by French physicians in 1959, the coma 
depasse was re-described by an ad hoc committee at Harvard 
University as “brain death” in 1968.13  By 1981, the new 
taxonomical category of “brain death” became part of UDDA, the 
Uniform Declaration of Death Act.  The 22-year period that spans 
Mollaret and Goulon’s discussion of Coma depasse, irreversible 
coma, and the retooled “declaration” of death testifies not only to 
the distinctive shift that has taken place in the constitution of legal 
death, from corporeal movement to televisual signal.  It also 
indexes the heterogeneity and contingency at play in the various 
criteria deployed around these boundary criteria, a boundary that 
is seemingly self evident but remarkably murky:  life/death. 
 
 
12 
 
This ambiguity is not, of course, confined to the present.  Physician 
John Cheyne, in his classic 1812 text on Cases of Apoplexy and 
Lethargy:  With Observations upon the Comatose Diseases, finds 
paradoxically that apoplexy (the coma’s genealogical cousin) 
strikes those who seemed least likely to be struck down by ill 
health.  And Cheyne’s attempts to define “apoplexy” meet with 
only what he would characterize as a “rhetorical” satisfaction.14 
 
 
13 
 
The continual ambiguity and contingency that haunt this 
“declaration” of death is evinced in numerous accounts of medical  
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practice.  Bioethicist Lance K. Stell writes of the effects of death’s 
apparent new multiplicity: 
 
 
 
Despite the intent to underscore the neurological basis 
of traditional criteria for death, the term “brain-death” 
has itself exacerbated confusion.  To many laypersons 
(and to some medical professionals too, 
unfortunately), “brain-death” suggests that there is 
more than one kind of death (“brain-death” and 
“cardio-respiratory death”), or that  there is more than 
one way to be dead (in a brain-sort-of-way  and in a 
heart-sort-of-way), or that there are degrees of being 
dead (“brain-dead” and “really dead” or “dead-dead”), 
or that one might die more than once (first, when 
one’s brain dies and again later when one’s heart 
stops).15 
 
 
  
 
This continual multiplicity provokes the question that I ask as a 
rhetorician:  How is this ambiguity and contingency managed in 
the narratives and articulations of the comatose body today, and 
what sorts of bodies and configurations of power do these 
management tactics enable? 
 
 
14 
 
The outbreak of excitement and uncertainty at the site of Dockery’s 
comatose body was managed, by the media, through relentless 
recourse to Dockery’s family.  The media too, talked a blue streak, 
and the unnerving possibility that it may have been the family’s 
discussion that provoked the outburst was continually alluded to 
even if it was rarely named.  So, too, did media reports imply that 
Dockery’s incommunicado was attributable to a lack of attention 
on the family’s part.  In the first year after the shooting, Dockery 
communicated with blinks, nods and grimaces, but “that stopped 
when visitors diminished after a few years.”16  At the same time, 
the family itself became the vector of comatose re-animation, as it 
was the very voices of the family that were presumed to have 
“energized” Dockery.17 
 
 
15 
 
Ungovernable even (or perhaps especially) by a medicine that 
deploys finer and finer distinctions, the comatose body becomes 
the promise and burden of families, an obligation toward the 
proper comportment of a body and its organs toward a future, a 
future riddled with contingency and subject to the continual 
articulations of a spectacle.  While Dockery’s mother “wrestled” 
with family members in the incalculable arguments over his 
surgery and his future, she also had to wrestle with the ongoing 
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interest of the media.  Indeed, according to the Web page devoted 
to the Dockery family: 
 
 
 
The Reunion Will Welcome 
Two Special Cousins
18
 
Two Special Cousins plan to attend the Association 
Reunion in Cherokee Co., NC the second weekend of 
September 1996.  They [include] . . . Dennis Dockery 
of Chattanooga, TN, who is a brother of Gary Dockery. 
Gary was the policeman who was shot in the head 
while on duty and had been in a coma for seven years 
when he suddenly began to talk this past February.  
This miracle story was widely reported by news media 
across America.  Dennis will bring us up-to-date on 
Gary’s condition, as well as how the family has 
attempted to deal with the media blitz.  
 
 
  
 
My point here is not that families should not be the locus of power 
in the complex economy of medicine and culture that surrounds 
the comatose patient.  Rather, this medical and media episode 
highlights the rather unstable character of the comatose body, a 
body for whom no medical distinctions appear adequate and 
whose diagnosis is rife with ambiguity.  In this situation, it is the 
“values” of the patient’s family that are called on to legitimate the 
governance of the comatose subject, “values” that also find little 
strength in distinctions.  Rather than a sign of contemporary 
medicine’s humanism, its tender yielding in the face of familial 
wishes, the recourse to the family as a site from which to govern 
the comatose body underscores the familial disciplines that form 
the unspoken ground of contemporary health, health that 
ultimately fails or returns under the aegis of familial “care.”  If 
health, as Leriche wrote, is life lived in the silence of the organs, 
then the coma is a silent life sustained within the noise of familial 
discourse. 
 
 
 
 
A Phone is Ringing . . . 
Hello?  
 
16 
 
A telephone is ringing, somewhere else.  A voice interrupts the 
ring somewhere in the middle, between the iteration of one ring – 
followed by another, and another.  
 
17 
 
The voice rings true.  It is indeed who we think it is.  A dead 
mother, separated from her son by war, by the Nazis, those  
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horrendous assemblages of division and erasure, lives, and the 
formerly infinite distance of death is bridged by an area code, an 
exchange, a four-digit number.  We have got death’s number – a 
simple inquiry into “information” suffices – and in return we 
receive a word, indeed, an “address.” 
 
18 
 
“Hello?”  This speech act – one that hums with an analysis 
provided by Avital Ronell, on another line – comes as a surprise, 
like all interruptions.19  It is an eruption of a question.  Noisy, this 
unprecedented speech act sounds difference, the difference of an 
altogether other future:  a future of life is on the line. 
 
 
19 
 
But we have to hang up, because this is the movies, a cinematic 
deployment of comas and their effects that, perhaps, doesn’t speak 
to us.  Our film, in hanging up, interrupts itself, images 
interruption.  What had been promised here, in David 
Cronenberg’s adaptation of Stephen King’s The Dead Zone, was 
the visual rendering of a comatose body that would, somehow, tell 
us its future, a future that does not, unlike the coma, bear the 
burdens of contingency.  Cronenberg’s camera images Christopher 
Walken, a high school English teacher (John Smith) smitten with 
the writing of horror – “Tomorrow, we’ll discuss The Legend of 
Sleepy Hollow.  I think you’ll like it.  It’s about a school teacher 
who gets chased by a headless demon” – as a coma victim who 
experiences a kind of “second sight” upon his “awakening” from a 
five-year coma, a period of no time at all for Smith ( or the viewer) 
but five years in cinema time, and thirty-five years to a TV dog.  
This second sight is less a mastery of the exercise of prophecy than 
an overtaking, a wave of the future that impacts Walken with all 
the terror of a force from the outside – the exteriority of thought, 
the “outside” of the body, the material intensities and 
transformations of time. 
 
 
20 
 
Overtaken by an image of the future, Walken acts to intervene in 
the image, to act in it and on it.  Hacking the future, Smith attracts 
familial connections – they are the point of articulation for this 
“second sight.”  The coma victim’s psychic powers are invested at 
nodes in the familial network.  “Your Daughter,” he screams to a 
nurse, “is screaming.”  “Your Mother,” Walken tells his astonished 
doctor, “she’s still alive.”  Family, in this rendition, becomes the 
obligatory passage point for any encounter with the future 
whatsoever.  Family, with its repetition of the tired old laws of lack, 
remains the hangup that will not be interrupted. 
 
 21  The potency of the family – its unique character as a site that can  
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channel, in effect, the future – is not materially limited to Johnny 
the coma victim’s strange powers.  It also emerges as a second 
order effect, a virtual ricochet of an actual vision.  Johnny’s 
deployment of his second sight under the media glare of television 
cameras provokes a stroke in his mother as she views the screen.  
The knowledge of a familial secret – “You want to know why your 
sister killed herself?”  Johnny says to an overly inquisitive member 
of the media – operates on maternal flesh through the virtual relay 
of the screen, at a distance.  Nuclear holocaust – one version of the 
future rendered in Smith’s second sight – is avoided when a 
populist, neo fascist political figure takes refuge from an assassin 
by hoisting the body of an infant to ward off bullets, bullets fired 
by Smith in his coma augmented “second sight.”  The flesh of 
heterosexual reproduction literally armors the present and 
forestalls the future, in all of its terrible difference. 
 
22 
 
Perhaps this investment of the power of the coma in the familial 
network is incidental to its representation in Cronenberg’s vision.  
But bundled with contemporary renderings of the comatose body 
as they appear in diverse American media outlets and 
international ecologies of literature, it would appear otherwise.20  
Instead comatose bodies and subjects are incessantly articulated 
through familial dramas, family “units” that are invested with new 
powers even as capital disperses, distributes and networks the 
nation state.  Ungovernable by states – who can only excel in the 
melancholy of waiting – it is only through the family that a coma 
patient “speaks.”21 
 
 
23 
 
Waiting, of course, is a practice of the interval, a space between 
actions.  The example with which we were interrupted – The Dead 
Zone – nicely contains the various ambiguities of this space 
“between” life and death by eliding them.  Smith awakens, scarless, 
and sees his healed body as a miraculous sign – all smashed up but 
“no bandages.”  Similarly the trauma that the comatose state poses 
for narrative – what will happen next? – is rendered invisible, 
passed over in the traversal of one scene by another.  And yet the 
radical ambiguity of the comatose state – is he alive? is he dead? 
how should we comport ourselves toward him? – produces other 
effects, the dissolution of the opposition between “past” and 
“future.”  As the mystery of the coma is figured here precisely 
through its elision of time– “You gotta understand,” Johnny 
explains to his former fiancée, “for me it is like we just spoke 
yesterday” – it is through his uncanny existence outside of time – 
the dead zone – that the coma continues to do its work in the 
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narrative. 
 
24 
 
But even as such an image arrests the ambiguity of the comatose 
body – a body that, in its return, can see outside of time, 
obliterating contingency – the alterity that seems to inhere in 
comatose bodies returns.  The very source of Walken’s “second 
sight” becomes undecidable, as soon as the stupor of the cinematic 
experience is shrugged off.  The paranoid viewer recalls that our 
schoolteacher had effectively prophesied his own coma with his 
assignment – “The Legend of Sleepy Hollow.”  The possibility that 
the prophecies deployed by Smith are of a literary and not a 
comatose origin haunts even this fantastic management of the 
thoroughly ambiguous coma, a state of corporeality that smears 
our definitions of life and death.  Under this reading – an 
experience of the film that one cannot choose but whose effects are 
irreversible – the comatose interval becomes less a cause than a 
trigger, a catalyst for the second sight whose roots are, very 
possibly, literary.22 
 
 
25 
 
As viewers of such a film, we are then placed in a remarkable 
quandary, even a hollow.  Certainly one could merely shrug off 
“Sleepy Hollow” as a cheap foreshadowing, a minor detail that 
retroactively produces a sense of “aha.”  But such an experience – 
the momentary, jouissance-laden gasp of recognition – is itself 
isomorphic to the profound interruption figured by the coma.  
That is, such an “aha” itself functions as what writer Catherine 
Clement has characterized as a “syncope,” a kind of micro-
awakening that proceeds from . . . a micro coma, a forgetting 
provoked by the viewing of a film, the reading of a text. 
 
 
26 
 
Thus even the degradation of the ridiculously literal B movie 
foreshadowing fostered by “Sleepy Hollow” serves only to provoke 
yet another question:  Where have I been?  While the viewer is 
hardly in the situation of corporeal injury referenced by 
Christopher Walken – all smashed up – she nevertheless enjoys an 
isomorphic dislocation.  Some small element of the past returns, 
and is recognized as a prophecy of the future, a tell-tale sign not 
heeded until it is literally too late – the present.  Such a dislocation 
puns on Johnny’s affliction – it is the second “cite,” the iteration of 
a text or an image through which one encounters one’s place 
“between” two cites, a hiatus or a breath through which the “aha” 
emerges. 
 
 
27 
 
Cronenberg and King's rewriting and repetition of the Sleepy 
Hollow tale– itself a tale of the terrible effects of the literary –  
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provokes the limbo of the coma in the viewers of The Dead Zone 
even as it ensures that the comatose body will only speak through 
the family.23  The rhetorical algorithm of The Dead Zone operates 
through an acceleration of the very logic that makes film possible.  
The interruption – that moment between Smith’s entry into a 
coma and his emergence – injects Walken with precisely the 
ingredient needed to “see” the future – interruption itself.  Not 
simply a lack or down time, Walken’s hiatus becomes a “sleepy 
hollow,” a space between life and death, one frame and the next, 
an interstice that enables the invisibility par excellence – time – to 
be imaged, transformed into a “zone.” 24 
 
28 
 
But what is imaged in The Dead Zone is not so much the future 
“itself” as the characteristic action of futures, events whose 
arrivals are syncopated in a rhythm of continual interruption.  
Interruption – that communication breakdown – is here figured as 
what the future does.  Smith does not know the future – he doesn’t 
even know, in the present, what the status of his encounter with 
the future is.  Instead, like the “syncope” that destroys his mother's 
body, the future interrupts Smith, and he, unlike our first caller, 
cannot hang up. 
 
 
29 
 
Such a logic of interruption – to encounter the future, let it break 
you up, put you into a coma, kill you – cannot, like our reading, be 
chosen.  Such a procedure is articulated in Deleuze and Guattari as 
the “connect-i-cut,” recipes for becoming, which depend on a 
healthy dose of forgetting and breakdown.25  As with exotic 
derivatives – those morphologies of capital whose encounter with 
the future depends crucially on an interval of non-knowledge, a 
dead zone of value – the comatose body is constituted by its noisy, 
inarticulable silence:  what will happen?26  In this register, The 
Dead Zone maps the governance of the comatose body by making 
it speak, and in so doing outlines contemporary modes of 
subjection – literally, the emergence of comatose individuals as 
they are networked with the family.  The family ventriloquizes the 
subject as a crucial aspect of its own propagation, a distribution 
that is not simply of a biological order. 
 
 
30 
 
Comatose bodies challenge the referential capacities of discourse.  
As in the fetus, they provoke a referential panic, a pro-lifer-ation 
of attempts to render a sturdy border between life and its others.27  
Sheer growth without consciousness, a becoming-plant, comatose 
bodies are uncanny for their doubling of life.  One sees the signs of 
life, one is even drawn to speak.  “Don’t leave me Johnny.  We’re 
gonna get married.”  Yet in the end, one just doesn’t know the 
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nature of one’s audience – where does the machine end, flesh 
begin? 
 
31 
 
But comas threaten more than the boundary between life and 
death or flesh and machines; they disturb reproduction itself, or at 
least the family’s monopoly on the propagation of human life 
through heterosexual reproduction.  After awakening from his 
accident – a close encounter with a milk truck, the beginning of a 
machinic nursing that allows him to wait for the future – Johnny is 
visited by his parents.  “You’ve been lost for five years, and now 
reborn unto me,” his mother declares.  With her Biblical citing , 
Vera recaptures the strange eruption of life out of the machinic 
environment of the coma into the logic of reproduction – “reborn 
unto me” – and reattaches the generation of vitality to a mother. 
“Lost,” without reference to the family, Johnny’s miraculous 
rebirth from the machinic labor or “trance” of the coma is the 
second cite or site of birth.  In naming it as a birth, Johnny’s 
mother both marks the threat to heterosexual reproduction posed 
by his revival and manages it through recourse to the maternal 
body. 
 
 
32 
 
For if life can emerge out of multiple connections to machines, the 
role of heterosexuality in the propagation of a human future 
becomes visibly and disturbingly questioned.  In place of the 
alliance of ovum, sperm and futurity, Johnny’s birth marks the 
new capacities of machines.  And unlike the offspring of 
reproduction, on whom the mark or “navel” of originality persists, 
the progeny of a machinic economy of replication foster an erasure 
of reference, a doubling that is at the core of the notion of 
“immortality” associated with cloning and uploading, a repetition 
that sutures the very interval foregrounded in The Dead Zone.  In 
place of the astonishing arrival of novelty associated with birth, 
such replicas offer the “already seen” or “ second sight” of deja vu.  
“There I am again.” 
 
 
33 
 
Indeed Johnny’s “accident,” all too predictably, occurs precisely 
through an interruption of heterosexual reproduction.  Instead of 
spending the night coupling with his fiancée, Smith ventures out to 
drive on roads slick with rain, promising to marry Sarah and 
noting that “Some things are worth waiting for.”  In the accident – 
itself caused by a trucker’s sleepy, nodding, hiatus – much blood, 
and much more milk, is spilled. 
 
 
34 
 
During the five year wait – what in banking terms we might call 
the “float” of Johnny’s promise to marry – Sarah, in the words of  
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Johnny’s mother, “cleaves now unto another man, a husband.”  To 
“cleave,” of course, means both to split and to attach, a connection 
that puns on cutting.  In this instance, Sarah’s connection to the 
husband produces a child, a 10-month-old son she introduces to 
Johnny with Freud’s famous epithet – “his majesty.”  Sitting 
around the table with Johnny, Sarah, and her son Denny, Johnny’s 
father remarks, “You know, it feels good to have a family eating 
around the table again.” 
 
35 
 
This network of examples seems to connect family – whether in its 
simulated form at the dinner table, the authoritative, as it were, 
Kingdom of the baby, or in the actual flesh of Johnny’s mother – to 
any means of making the coma refer.  In the discourse of his 
mother, Johnny’s emergence from the coma marks his hiatus as a 
long labor, a labor that in the end is a rebirth unto the maternal 
body.  In place of a lively ecology of machines, Johnny is reborn 
unto a mother, ensuring at least a rhetorical monopoly of the 
maternal on reproduction. 
 
 
36 
 
In the context of the simulated family gathered around the table, 
the coma is occluded through recourse to the evidence of Denny, a 
child testifying to the apparent fantasy of the past, “his majesty” 
the king whose word, or silence, is law:  the coma never happened, 
Johnny and Sarah’s coupling was never interrupted, and the 
maternal body of Johnny’s mother has been exchanged for the 
reproductive success of Sarah.  Here the family form is established 
precisely to the extent that maternity and paternity– those signs of 
“family” – are iterable and thus detachable from any particular 
context.  In this milieu, the immortality of the family form itself – 
its ability to replicate over time, ad infinitum – helps manage the 
strange contingency and finitude of the coma. 
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To make “sense” both of the odd state of the coma and the miracle 
of its closure, the eruption of life out of machines, families are 
mobilized.  In the face of what Guattari has characterized as new 
“collective arrangements,” social and technical groupings that 
would bestow and maintain the life of human beings, narratives of 
the coma recuperate the monopoly of the family on “life” by 
making the coma speak only on the register of the familial.  
Indeed, even in his flight from the traces of family – he no longer 
can bear seeing his former fiancée – Johnny provides us with his 
second cite from Sleepy Hollow:  “As he was a bachelor, and in 
nobody’s debt, nobody troubled their head about him anymore.”  
An alleged escape from the familial matrix operates only through 
the double negations of family and capital – bachelorhood and 
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indebtedness.  The “value” of the family, in this context, emerges 
from an ability to evaluate the strange event called the coma. 
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In contrast to the comatose body, which miraculously emerges out 
of an environment of machines and care, his majesty heterosexual 
reproduction is conceptualized as a Euclidean, triangular relation 
– Mommy Daddy Child – by the Christianity of the father, a 
psychoanalysis of the Law and by that state privilege dubbed the 
“tax write off” in the contemporary United States.  This clean logic 
– one which continually reinscribes the “autonomy” of the 
fetus/child, the father, the mother, as if all weren’t entangled with 
all – tames the obvious multiplicity of heterosexual reproduction 
into an order:  heredity.  Reproduction’s territory, its necessary 
habitat, becomes narratable in terms of a name.  As such, “family” 
operates as an algorithm, a recipe for converting the syntactic 
distributions of alterity – the chance and “drift” at play in 
evolutionary systems – into the semantic, narratable regimes of a 
people that know who they are:  “You are a Doyle!” 
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This command at the heart of the family is threatened by the 
comatose body’s refusal to signify – “I can’t hear you!” as a drill 
sergeant might put it.  It is disturbed as well by the visible rhizome 
of connections that make the ongoing life of a comatose body 
possible, a tangle of connections that renders laughable any simple 
demarcation of the comatose “subject.”28  Mute, without response, 
comatose bodies seem always about to speak.  The strange 
confessionals that accompany the rhythmic, machinic cadence of 
the coma are judgments that the coma is a becoming, a trajectory 
and not a state.  About to speak, about to die, the comatose body 
fosters continual becomings-other. 
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The fact that something else, it seems, is always about to happen to 
the comatose body foregrounds the incessant labor and discipline 
the familial franchise demands, as this anticipatory state calls forth 
every interpretation of every sign that can be mustered.  This 
discipline – the means by which families might maintain their 
monopoly on reproduction, on human life itself – operates not 
only through the deployment of flesh, but through the propagation 
and actualization of concepts.  In the case of comas, an uncanny 
entity I will call the “virtual maternal” forestalls the possibility that 
something other than human, heterosexual reproduction is 
entailed in the emergence of a coma survivor’s life. 
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And Mommy’s on the Phone . . . 
Or, “It’s a Coma!”29 
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Feminist scholars have argued convincingly that the threats posed 
to the familial monopoly by reproductive technologies have 
recoiled onto women’s bodies.  The rhetorical amputation of the 
fetus from maternal bodies bites into actual flesh, as the uteruses 
of women have increasingly become incarcerated, surveyed, 
purchased, and disciplined.  But the new technologies of life-
maintenance also interpolate the contemporary family, and this 
threat entails precisely the obliteration of the body enacted in the 
discourse of fetal “rights.”  In this case, however, the maternal 
body is far from invisible – it becomes a privileged site for making 
comatose bodies speak, a body that the family recomposes out of 
its fetal obliteration.  This composition operates not through the 
attachment of a fetal body to actual flesh – in The Dead Zone, 
mothers are either killed , telephonically terminated, or shot at – 
but through the rhetorical production of maternal effects.  Having 
liquidated the body and agency of motherhood in the 
contemporary United States, families recompose the maternal 
body, the possibility of heterosexual reproduction, through virtual 
tactics.  Forced to speak out of her silent labor, the mother appears 
in The Dead Zone as a telephonic entity, one who mothers without 
consciousness, a machine for reproduction.30 
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If a comatose body’s trajectory – its becoming – is rendered unto 
narrative by the maternal body, this rendering is an uneasy, even 
labored, one.  Ventriloquizing Biblical prose, Johnny’s mother 
attempts to connect his return to the divine matrix of 
reproduction.  But the very oddity of Vera’s speech – its character 
as a cite , a machinic repetition from elsewhere – unhinges the 
connection:  Neither resurrection nor birth, Johnny’s return 
appears without causation, without origin, a “miracle.”  Nursed by 
networks of machines and care, the comatose body puts a new spin 
on the reproductive concept of “expecting.” 
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For if Smith – or, as his “John Doe” name suggests, any coma 
victim whatsoever – emerges into life out of a machine 
environment, it is a life of the future.  Befallen by the future, the 
comatose body is a virtual body, one continually anticipated but 
not yet actualized.  One speaks to it and waits . . . “waiting 
patiently for something to happen.”31  Literally unconscious, alive, 
comatose bodies become conscious subjects through the 
continually, hopefully, expected interruption called the future.  
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Without recourse to consciousness – of a mother and her labor, of 
a fertility clinic, of a surrogate– life emerges, veritably laboring 
with the future. 
 
44 
 
Valerie Hartouni articulates this odd capacity of the comatose 
body to labor in her 1991 essay, “Containing Women:  
Reproductive Discourse in the 1980’s.”  Hartouni focuses on the 
ability of the maternal body to disappear under the increased 
visibility and agency of the fetus.  But Hartouni’s analysis also 
enables an understanding not of the disappearance of the 
maternal, but of its deterritorialization, its becoming-virtual. 
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Hartouni describes the case of a newspaper headline:  “Brain-Dead 
Mother Has Her Baby.”  In this instance of a comatose body that 
has become downright swollen with agency – for clearly in this 
instance “having” is most definitely a “doing” – Hartouni 
highlights the paradoxical annihilation of maternal agency as the 
“mother” becomes less verb than noun.  In the context of its 
citation into a headline, Hartouni notes that “motherhood is 
equated with pregnancy and thereby reduced to a physiological 
function, a biologically rooted, passive – indeed in this case, 
literally mindless – state of being.”32   Indeed Hartouni argues that 
as such nouns or states of being, pregnant women are merely 
“mediums or physical vessels for new life, not active participants in 
its creation or maintenance.”33 
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But what are the capacities of “mediums?”  Hartouni’s analysis 
suggests that media are bereft, impoverished in agency, “passive” 
and immobile, “biologically rooted.”  But perhaps media – like 
Johnny in The Dead Zone – is precisely in the middle, neither 
active nor passive, present nor absent, live nor dead, here nor 
there.34 Perhaps media are virtual, on-the-line.  As virtuals, such 
media do not lack agency but instead distribute it – they articulate 
the connections in any network of actualization.  As such, a 
medium’s promises and threats emerge from their location in 
limbo, go-betweens. 
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This limbo agency of the virtual resides partially in its capacity for 
repetition.  At times, Deleuze and Guattari describe the very 
distinction between the virtual and the actual in terms of speed 
and slowness, as actuality arrives in a kind of “freeze frame” that 
brings reference to bear on the multiplicity of the virtual.  These 
speeds can be understood as the facility to be repeated in different 
contexts, an attribute roughly analogous to the quality of “velocity” 
in monetarist economics.  Betweenness has its benefits – 
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connectivity increases with deterritorialization. 
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This transformation of a virtual into an actual requires repetition 
and it is through iterability (and subsequent distributivity) that 
virtuals are “selected.”  For even Hartouni’s deployment of the 
example/sample “Brain-Dead Mother Has Her Baby” relies on its 
extraction and repetition.  No less than the delivery of the 
fetus/baby itself, Hartouni’s mobilization of “Brain-Dead Mother 
Has Her Baby” relies on its ability to be cut out of its alleged 
“location,” much as Hartouni notes that with the rhetorical 
operations of video and visualization technology “the live fetal 
image of the clinic appears to have been transported into 
everyone’s living room.”35  Indeed, in this sense actuality – the 
emergence of reference – is thoroughly entangled with virtuality – 
the capacity for dispersal.  This is stated most clearly by Deleuze 
and Guattari when they note that “there is no reproduction 
without genetic drift.” 
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Such a power of drift, distribution, or delivery is indeed an 
attribute of media.  They function as speedy replicators as well as 
articulators, and are contagious enough to sprout, ungovernably, 
in multiple contexts.  More than an accidental predicate, media 
entail a primordial dislocation at play with the real.  “The virtual 
must be defined as strictly a part of the real object – as though the 
object had one part of itself in the virtual into which it plunged as 
though into an objective dimension.”36 
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In this instance, as in every other, only by being treated in terms of 
what Deleuze calls differentiation – a partitioning into articulable, 
narratable distinctions, “as though” – can the virtual be rendered.  
It must be actualized as a virtual, determined in configurations of 
space and time that enable it to refer, to become a “problem” for 
which actualization, becoming, is the solution.  It is through the 
virtual that the monstrosity of metamorphosis can be referenced, 
treated not as a vague promise – of the tadpole, “maybe it will be a 
frog” – but as the positivity of becoming.  If virtuals form a hollow 
of an “objective dimension” where the real has its tendrils, they are 
no less complicit with their own delivery by the future, the capacity 
to be acted upon.  Deleuze describes the differential 
transformation of virtual into actual through recourse to the figure 
of labor – at first of the economic kind, but then through the 
embryo:  “The destiny and achievement of the embryo is to live the 
unlivable, to sustain forced movements of a scope that would break 
any skeleton or tear ligaments.”37 
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This logically impossible event – living the “unlivable”– proceeds 
not through the usual operations of “agency,” “action,” or 
“strength.”  It instead requires a flexibility, a tremendous facility 
for difference.  This sensitivity to difference operates in contact 
with the future:  “They can only be lived . . .”38  It is in this sense 
that even the virtual is complicit with the future, and that 
“mediums” enable and distribute agency more than they suffer its 
lack. 
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Hence Hartouni’s understanding of the “passive” “biological” 
mother must be supplemented with a mapping of the effects of the 
very “mediums” she fears are being evacuated of agency.  It is 
exactly the “flexibility” of media – their ability to be, like Johnny, 
affected by the future – that makes the arrival of novelty, indeed 
birth, possible.  In comparing possible alternative formulations of 
“Brain-Dead Mother Has Her Baby,” Hartouni notes that it is 
through the disavowal of the “social activities and meanings on the 
one hand” of the mother and the amplification of “biological 
processes on the other” that the comatose mother is constituted as 
a medium.  And yet the event of the technologically and 
rhetorically entangled “Brain-Dead Mother” is exactly what draws 
these distinctions into question as oppositions, suggesting that 
reproduction has perhaps sprouted more than two hands.39 
 
 
 
 
That’s One Way of Putting It . . . 
Or, Aha  
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Dependent on an unforeseeable future, the emergence from a 
coma is also of course difficult to narrate.  Upon awakening, 
Smith’s doctor informs him that he had been a “guest” for some 
time, a locution which Smith greets with a snort while responding, 
“That’s one way of putting it.”  This strange hospitality to which 
the guest Smith is indebted is indeed multiple:  there are many 
ways to “put it.”  As a guest, Smith occupies an ethical position 
distinct from the son or even the patient.  Dependent for his life 
not on the interiority of a will but on the exteriority of care and 
machines, a postmodern, machinic,” kindness of strangers,” 
Smith’s relation with the doctor is first and foremost an encounter 
– no “expression” brokers the relation, and even a simulated 
intersubjectivity can only occur retroactively.  Only after a 
thoroughly contingent – even miraculous – awakening can the 
care and relation of the doctor and Smith be articulated as a 
relation.  Thus orphaned– of “no relation” – Smith is in some 
sense, as his mother puts it, “lost,” outside of the rhetorical regime 
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of the family.  Yet this “loss” is hardly lacking – in the meantime, 
as it were, Smith has plugged into, been connected to, a entire 
machinic rhizome. 
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Smith’s relation to the machines and care that animate him – 
perhaps like our relation to cinema – operates on multiple 
registers, none of which are fundamentally acts of expression.  The 
turning of his body, the connection of a feeding tube, the 
administration of a drug – these are recipes or procedures 
concerned not with “representation” or even “communication” but 
with discipline and desire – the desire to discipline and cultivate 
Smith’s body back into “life.” Even after awakening, of course, the 
discipline continues:  therapy and therapists, operations and 
drugs, foster the possibility of Smith’s return to “normality.” 
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Yet this discipline is not confined to technology or even medicine 
in the usual sense.  The shouts of his physical therapist – “Give me 
one more lap!” – remind us that the ordering of Smith’s ( and 
Dockery’s) body is also a rhetorical enterprise.  Cronenberg’s film 
– perhaps for good reason, as we shall see – offers the possibility 
of a line of flight from the maternal register of this rhetoric, as the 
film engenders, and does not merely express, the syncope of the 
coma.  Even while it attaches the disturbing vitality of Smith’s 
“flashes” to the maternal body through the expressive force of its 
narrative, a narrative in which the comatose body speaks, the film 
undoes any attempt to arrest the ambiguity of the coma.  Figured 
by a cut, a fracture “between” scenes that is the very MacGuffin of 
the film, the coma remains uninterpretable, a blank that is not a 
lack.  More than “offstage,” or “behind the scenes,” the coma is 
imaged as an interruption, the very synaptic fissure which makes 
cinema, subjectivity, possible – the “gap” or interstice between two 
cites or sights.40  The film features, of course, the disciplining of 
Smith – by the media, as well as his “lost” familial order – but this 
discipline instills yet another affect in the viewer:  becoming-
comatose.  For if the “interstice” of both the cinematic frame and 
the coma – in The Dead Zone, these entities are identical, fractals 
of each other – images nothing but time, it thwarts interpretation 
even as it carries out its effects – an encounter with, but not an 
expression of, the future.  Aha. 
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At the level of “consciousness,” this encounter literally does not 
occur – it registers a blank.  And yet on the register of the film’s 
movement, the very condition of possibility for a narrative that 
would attach the life of the coma to the maternal body, this blank 
is production itself, the proliferation of images, the visualization of 
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multiplicity called cinema.   And perhaps the most singular 
figuration of this interruption is the -click- with which I began, the 
hang up on a lost mother on the phone, long distance.  This hang 
up cleaves – sticks together and divides – the maternal body and 
the coma, as the coma contacts the mother without her 
knowledge. 
 
57 
 
This notion of “contact” extends to the viewer of the Dead Zone.  
Steven Shaviro, writing of a notion of cinema as “contagion,” notes 
that this shift in the premises of film theory lead away from a 
fixation on “identification.”  “When I am caught up in watching a 
film I do not really ‘identify’ in a psychoanalytic sense . . . it is more 
the case that I am brought into intimate contact with the images 
on the screen by a process of mimesis or contagion.”41  Shaviro, 
after Benjamin, characterizes this contact as a “tactile 
convergence,” an encounter between viewer and image that 
implodes any vision which would render the visual in terms of a 
distance between a “subject” and an “image.”  Instead the viewer 
enjoys and suffers a strange intimacy with the screen.  She is 
composed as a multiplicity, neither inside nor outside the image, a 
medium or mobius body that conducts intensities and flows.  
Conducting a coma, The Dead Zone brings the viewer into contact 
with the blinding, impossible vision of interruption.  It interrupts 
vision and even consciousness as it induces the syncope of 
experiencing oneself being interrupted, becoming-comatose.  
Shaviro, via Bataille, describes an “anti-vision” of film that 
uncannily mimes the very content and experience of The Dead 
Zone.  “We see that which exceeds the possibility of seeing, that 
which it is intolerable to see.  And it occurs in a time of repetition, 
without a living present, a time that linear narrative cannot fill.”42 
 
 
 
 Familial Futures  
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Networked with other films and novels of the period, such as 
Michael Crichton’s adaptation of the Robin Cook novel, Coma, The 
Dead Zone’s investment of the coma victim with the family 
becomes articulable within the matrix of tensions surrounding the 
“neomort” or “living cadaver.”  More than a metaphysical 
distinction, the emergence of brain death was associated with the 
increased “procurement” of organs for transplantation.  This 
tension – the uncertainty of determining death in the age of life 
support, and the need for such certainty in an organ donation 
market– traversed Crichton’s “Coma” in the form of organ 
harvesting – the ascription of brain death to otherwise healthy 
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patients for the purpose of organ acquisition.  The Dead Zone, 
rather than manifesting an anxiety of the body’s new possibilities 
as commodity, narrates the relentlessly futural character of 
corporeality, a futurity most easily accessed through the donation 
of the “living body” that houses the “dead” brain to others, a future 
continually referenced in materials that recruit organ donors.43 
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This future – another body that might live through elements of the 
deceased – has a particularly familial flavor, as the family is both a 
locus of the decision to donate organs and, sometimes, their 
recipient.  When Monte Burns, the brutal but affectless capitalist 
on “The Simpsons,” learned he had a son, he failed in his attempt 
to simulate the love of a parental bond but remarked, with great 
sentimentality, “It’s good to know . . . that there’s another kidney 
out there for me.” 
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Perhaps the location of this sample – a flickering animated image 
transduced to video – evinces the character of this new form of life 
maintenance.  Living tissues no longer reside within the confines 
of an allegedly autonomous body, but are instead contingently 
networked with differential futures, futures of animation.  New 
segments of life are being produced through the organization of 
donation and the dosing of immune systems.  This production of 
life – “The Gift of Life” – emerges only through the transforming 
of selves – futurity emerges for the transplant recipient only 
through the disciplining of the very contours of the self, a self 
sculpted both of drugs and discourse, a rhetorical and 
pharmaceutical hybrid.44 
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But this futural character of contemporary corporeality – its ability 
to act in a future, without consciousness – poses severe challenges 
to any system that would procure and allocate human organs.  If 
such dispensations are to emerge from a citizen, such subjects 
must enjoy the proleptic ability to act in the future, after one’s 
death.  In other words, organs must become concepts – treatable 
and articulable in terms of their ability to become rather than 
maintain.45  They are treated in terms of their capacity for 
difference. 
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This extension of agency past the life of the subject paradoxically 
depends upon the agency of the family.  For if the body is to be a 
transaction site in the absence of a subject, it is the family that 
brokers and executes this transaction.  The very death of the 
subject that enables the gift of organ donation thwarts any 
testimony of the gift’s propriety.  Thus the family – and not merely 
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writing, a contract, a donor card – is called forth to ventriloquize 
the brain dead subject:  “To be an Organ & Tissue donor, even if 
you've signed something, you must tell your family now, so they 
can carry out your wishes later.”46  This testimony to the future 
perfect desires of the comatose – “this is what she would have 
wanted” – is not, of course, without its share of ambiguity, an 
incapacity which continually haunts and perhaps thwarts organ 
donation.  In the context of the termination of life support – the 
proverbial “pulling of the plug” – this ambiguity has lead to the 
invention of a new speech act in the United States, Australia and 
Western Europe – the living will. 
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Thus while it is clear that the technologies of life support and the 
legal armature of brain death mark a decisive diagram of 
subjectivity – even in brain death, a subject persists, variously 
entangled with both the law and machines – comas also mark new 
configurations of power that emerge out of the “family.”  Even as 
the technologies of life support and organ transplantation – the 
twin vectors that compose the coma as such a site of anxiety – 
make possible new modes of human hybridization, it is the 
discourse of the family that ensures the continual attachment of a 
point of view or “center” to the distributed rhizome of growth that 
embeds comatose bodies.  Indeed the value of the family almost 
seems to emerge out of its ability to govern the proliferating 
disturbances that such technologies pose for “life.”47 
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This position of families as the “governing” body for coma patients 
is outlined in a recent court decision in Pennsylvania, where the 
right to terminate life support from a patient in a permanent 
vegetative state (coma) is granted to families, even in the absence 
of a living will or “advance health care declaration.”  Note that this 
remarkable power of interruption is withheld from women 
themselves, as an advance health care declaration becomes null in 
the event that a woman is suspected of pregnancy:  “A declaration 
by a pregnant woman will not become effective unless a physician 
has determined that the life-sustaining treatments either (a) will 
not permit the live birth of the unborn child, (b) will be physically 
harmful to the pregnant woman, or (c) would cause pain to the 
pregnant woman.”48  Here the agency of women’s bodies is both 
referenced and obliterated. Literally cleft from her own “living 
will,” the proleptic desire of woman becomes null and void, or at 
least without effects, not “effective.”  Under this rubric, the agency 
of (possibly) pre-menopausal women becomes haunted by the 
specter of pregnancy. 
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At the same time, this cleavage of the living will from 
Pennsylvanian women reinscribes the limbo agency of the 
maternal body itself.  Capable of birth, capable of pain, the 
maternal body is not simply erased in the desire to foster the 
fetus.  Instead it is cleaved, detached from the past desire of a 
woman and attached to the future capacities of the maternal body, 
capacities which by definition are virtual – attached to the future 
as much as a mother and life support – and not actual.  Thus it is 
the virtual maternal which is detached from the body of a desiring 
woman, a virtuality which enables the literal propagation of a 
family even as this propagation is detached from the specificity of 
any individual female subject.  Somebody in Pennsylvania read 
“Brain-Dead Mother Has Her Baby.” 
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The emergence of a body which lives up to Heidegger’s dictum 
concerning the “essence” of technology – the coma is Nothing, 
technological– would seem to remind us even more forcefully of 
Spinoza’s refrain:  We don’t know what a body can do.49  Endowed 
with new capacities of distribution, contemporary bodies cultivate 
futures through routes other than reproduction.  Connected with 
life by machines as well as so called “biological” multiplicities, 
human and otherwise, the networked body of the coma relates not 
to a future of knowledge, but of contingency.  A virtual 
corporeality, the comatose body is, in the phrasing of philosopher 
Elizabeth Grosz, “befallen by the future.”50  Its genealogy is, then, 
uncertain, available for difference, aleatory to the assemblage of 
family that would send a name, and the flesh to bear it, into the 
future.  The comatose body encounters a future that cannot be 
divined – no reliable algorithm exists to signify its future, to 
predict with precision the actualization of its virtuality.  “He tried 
to protest, to tell her that he didn’t want to do great works, heal, or 
speak in tongues, to divine the future.  . . He tried to tell her, but 
his tongue wouldn’t obey his brain.”51 
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In the silence of the coma, betwixt tongue and brain, a dead zone, 
the American family speaks.  Despite the much noted “decline” of 
the family and the threats that various post industrial 
configurations allegedly pose to it, it is the family that ultimately 
governs the comportment and treatment of the comatose body.  If 
the comatose body troubles our understandings of the medical and 
legal spaces of life and death, it is through the discourse of the 
family that this odd, resistant body becomes governable, even 
divined. 
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“Here’s Johnny!” 
Or, Textual Delivery  
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At the Westfall Health Care Center in Brighton, N.Y., a 29 year old 
woman, comatose for ten years in the wake of a car accident, 
developed a swelling of the belly, indicating a pregnancy.  One 
media account narrated the 1996 event in terms of a textual 
materialization or delivery:  “It is as if a particularly diabolical 
textbook problem for budding ethicists has been transposed to 
grim reality in upstate New York.”52  What was remarkable about 
this horrifying rape was its immediate management by the 
discourse of familial reproduction, as the woman’s family 
determined that she would want to bear the child.  “The New York 
woman had been a devout Roman Catholic.  Says Ellen Moskowitz, 
a lawyer and ethicist at the Hastings Center, “It seems reasonable 
to conclude this is the kind of decision she would have wanted.”53  
By continuously invoking the “values” of the famed yet anonymous 
woman in terms of the discourse of “pro-life,” the family was able 
to render a paradoxical decision “against abortion.”  Carrying the 
child to term – with the help of life support – was continually 
warranted through recourse to the woman’s “pro life” values, 
without which such a birth out of life maintenance would have 
been, in Hartouni’s phrasing, “virtually unintelligible.” 
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And yet perhaps it is only virtually that this birth is made possible.  
The delivery is entangled with the enunciation of the woman’s 
family – it is literally enabled by a statement, along with some 
other machines.  The statement or command – “do not abort!” – is 
utterable, in this instance, only to the extent that it can articulate 
the alleged desires of the woman.  These desires are neither here 
nor there, embedded in the discourses and practices of the past 
and yet strangely effective on the present and the future.  The 
family functions as a relay – or ventriloquism – of desire. 
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As desires, these discourses and practices do not refer; they are 
promises of a capacity to be affected and perhaps transformed.  “I 
want” is less a reference to a lack than a sensitivity to an other.  So, 
too, is this sensitivity itself characterized by its citationality, a 
capacity for the repetition and drift of geography and time.  It is in 
this sense that the discourse of the woman in question is virtual.  
Indeed it is the actualization of the woman’s desires as virtual that 
enables this birth, as her desires are treated as detachable from 
any particular actualization, “what she would have wanted.” 
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And how are these virtuals actualized?  The instantiation of the 
woman’s desires takes place through both the enunciation and 
narratives of family.  The woman’s ghost is summoned to speak, a 
living ghost.  This ghost is provocative of, but does not represent, 
the past.  An uncanny stranger hailed as much by the citable 
character of the familial narrative as it is by the life support 
mechanisms that enable its development, the baby sprouts out of 
familial discourse, a discursive budding or hybrid that allows for 
the reproduction of family “value” into the future, a fleshly delivery 
that emerges partially from an utterance. 
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Crucial to the decision to enable this birth, the first live birth from 
a continually comatose body, was the ascription of agency to the 
mother even as it was erased.  Doctors noted that “the natural 
forces of labor could possibly be in tact in the woman, but without 
voluntary cooperation in pushing, the delivery would require 
forceps or a vacuum.”54  As with our earlier phone call, the 
connection to the mother is established, but without her 
knowledge.  Familial production operates here not as the 
reproduction of individuals but as the proliferation of the familial 
itself, the actualization of virtual entities or values bound not to 
consciousness but to the production of other live bodies, live 
bodies that emerge out of the rhetorical, virtual space of 
“decision.”  These remarkable pragmatics of speech emerge out of 
a virtual, familial response to that old, supposedly enigmatic 
psychoanalytic puzzler:  What does woman want? 
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Ungovernable by the taxonomies or articulations of medicine, the 
comatose body renders not merely another human, but an 
occasion for the exercise of familial power.  The nonstop public 
performance we call family, rather than wounded by the strife of 
the uncanny space between life and death, is constituted by it.  The 
family speaks, it decides, and children are born.  With this child – 
a 2-pound, 11-ounce boy born March 18, 1996, let us call him 
“Johnny” – a new speech act is born, a discursive birth that 
performatively constitutes the flesh of the future:  “We Are 
Family.” 
© Richard Doyle, 1998. 
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